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John V Orth*
‘ThE gOLDEN METWAND’: 
ThE MEASURE OF JUSTICE IN ShAKESPEARE’S 
MEASuRE FOR MEASuRE
Measure for Measure, one of Shakespeare’s ‘problem plays’, is a dark 
comedy depicting Duke Vincentio’s efforts to restore respect for the 
law after a period of lax enforcement. Peopled with a wide variety of 
law-enforcers and law-breakers, the play implicates numerous legal 
issues and has consequently attracted the attention of lawyers and 
judges. In the 18th century Sir William Blackstone contributed notes 
on the play, and in the 20th century judges have quoted from it in their 
judicial opinions. Like all good legal dramas, Measure for Measure 
ends with a trial scene, but one in which the Duke orders the accused 
to judge his own case, thereby forcing him to confront his own guilt, 
while Shakespeare forces us all to confront the difficulty of doing 
earthly justice.
Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure was first performed by His Majesty’s Players before King James I and his court on 26 December 1604.1 The King must have been pleased with the play, which involved a princely figure not 
unlike himself rooting out corruption and dispensing justice ‘like power divine’; 
he ordered a repeat performance a week later. Long recognised as a ‘law play’ — 
John Mortimer recently included it on his short list of the best fictional portrayals 
of the legal world2 — Measure for Measure ends appropriately with a trial scene, 
but (as we would expect from Shakespeare) one with an unusual twist. During the 
final Act, charges of corruption are brought against Angelo, the deputy who ruled 
Vienna during the temporary absence of its Duke, Vincentio. The newly returned 
Duke orders an immediate trial: ‘Come, cousin Angelo, / In this I’ll be impartial; be 
you judge / Of your own cause.’3
1 R C Bald ‘Introduction’ in Pelican Shakespeare: Measure for Measure (1956) 15 
(reporting the performance ‘by his Majesties plaiers’ (otherwise known as ‘The 
King’s Men’) of ‘a play Caled Mesur for Mesur’ by ‘Shaxberd’). Line references to 
Acts and scenes are as numbered in this edition.
2 John Mortimer, ‘Five Best: John Mortimer Presents His Case for These Fictional 
Portraits of the Legal World’, Wall Street Journal (New York) 24–5 February 2007, 
10. The other entries were three classic 19th-century novels — Bleak House and 
Great Expectations by Charles Dickens and Orley Farm by Anthony Trollope — and 
one modern crime novel, A Certain Justice by P D James. Measure for Measure was 
the only play.
3 5.1.165–7.
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of 
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Royal reaction to this remarkable order has been lost to time, but Shakespeare’s 
first editors were clearly shocked. Theobald commented, ‘Surely, this Duke had 
odd notions of Impartiality; to profess it, and then commit the Decision of a Cause 
to the Person accus’d of being the Criminal,’ and concluded in the innocency of 
those early days of Shakespeare scholarship, ‘the Poet must have wrote as I have 
corrected [him], In this I will be partial …’.4 Malone sensibly restored the text as 
attested by the First Folio, but palliated the usage by asserting that ‘impartial’ 
could sometimes be used to mean ‘partial’!5 That Shakespeare wrote just what he 
intended is evidenced by the fact that he included a denunciation of the Duke’s 
skewed order, delivered by none other than the Duke himself disguised as a friar: 
‘The Duke’s unjust, / Thus to retort your manifest appeal / And put your trial in the 
villain’s mouth / Which here you come to accuse.’6
As the theatre audience knows, the Duke had not, in fact, been absent but had 
remained in Vienna in disguise in order to observe the effects of Angelo’s 
governance. His stated purpose was to allow Angelo, whose reputation for 
righteousness seemed unimpeachable, to restore respect for the law, which 
had declined under the Duke’s too indulgent rule. ‘We have strict statutes and 
most biting laws, / The needful bits and curbs to headstrong steeds, / Which for 
this fourteen years we have let slip.’7 But the Duke also purposed a test of ‘the 
4 Lewis Theobald, The Works of Shakespeare (1733 ed) vol 1, 387–8; see also A New 
Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: Measure for Measure 247 (Mark Eccles, 1980 ed) 
(collecting authorities).
5 Edmond Malone, The Plays and Poems of William Shakespeare (1821 ed) vol 9, 187 
(citing, inter alia, the anonymous play, Swetnam the Woman-Hater (1620): ‘You are 
impartial, and we do appeal / From you to judges more indifferent’).
6 5.1.298–301. Compare Portia’s observation in The Merchant of Venice — in the 
casket scene, not the courtroom scene — that ‘to offend and judge are distinct 
offices, / And of opposed natures’ (Pelican Shakespeare: The Merchant of Venice 
(1959) 2.9.60–1). What could be expected from a judge in his own cause is made 
plain in Twelfth Night, when Olivia comforts the wronged Malvolio: ‘Prithee be 
content. / This practice hath most shrewdly passed upon thee; / But when we know 
the grounds and authors of it, / Thou shalt be both the plaintiff and the judge / Of 
thine own cause’ (Pelican Shakespeare: Twelfth Night (1958) 5.1.341–4). There 
is something similar in Othello. The Venetian Duke comforts Brabantio, who had 
accused the Moor of seducing his daughter Desdemona: ‘Whoe’re he be that in this 
foul proceeding / Hath thus beguiled your daughter of herself, / And you of her, the 
bloody book of law / You shall yourself read in the bitter letter / After your own 
sense’ (Pelican Shakespeare: Othello (1958) 1.3.67–9).
7 1.3.19–21. In this one instance I have departed from the Pelican edition reading. 
The First Folio prints ‘needful bits and curbs to headstrong weeds’. Pelican amends 
‘weeds’ to ‘wills’, which makes more sense, but Theobald suggests ‘steeds’, which 
seems to me to make even more sense and to fit better in the consonant-heavy line 
(Theobald, above n 4, 306). Professor Jaffa has observed that the Duke’s plan is 
reminiscent of Cesare Borgia’s Machiavellian scheme to pacify Romagna without 
risking his own popularity (Henry V Jaffa, ‘Chastity as a Political Principle: An 
Interpretation of Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure’ in J Alvis and T West (ed) 
Shakespeare as Political Thinker (1981) 181, 188–9 (citing Niccolo Machiavelli, The 
Prince (first published 1532) ch 7)).
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prenzie Angelo’ — ‘Hence shall we see, / If power change purpose, what our 
seemers be’8 — a test the deputy all too quickly failed. Soon after sentencing 
Claudio to death under a long-ignored law against fornication, Angelo succumbed 
to temptation himself when petitioned by Claudio’s beautiful sister, Isabella, 
an aspiring nun, and offered to pardon her brother in return for sex, demanding 
fornication by the sister in return for pardoning it in the brother. By convenient 
happenstance, the Duke knew of the hitherto overlooked fact that Angelo had 
earlier jilted Mariana (her of ‘the moated grange’) after her dowry had been lost 
and arranged to substitute one maiden for another in the dark to satisfy Angelo’s 
concupiscence.9
Compounding his offence, Angelo had actually ordered the beheading of Claudio 
to go ahead even as his own assault on Isabella’s maidenhead was (seemingly) 
in prospect. Working in the background, the Duke managed to spare Claudio, 
deceiving both Angelo and Isabella, so that on his re-emergence in his true 
character in the final Act, he could stage-manage the trial of Angelo on the charges 
brought by the aggrieved young woman. Knowing the truth of the matter, the Duke 
is not in fact ‘impartial’ as he claims, but by observing whether Angelo will accept 
the assignment to be ‘judge of your own cause’, he is posing a public test for the 
unjust deputy, one Angelo also fails.
His corruption dramatically exposed, Angelo acknowledges that he is worthy to 
die the death he intended for another: ‘Then, good prince, / No longer session hold 
upon my shame, / But let my trial be mine own confession. / Immediate sentence, 
then, and sequent death / Is all the grace I beg.’10 The Duke readily agrees: ‘An 
Angelo for Claudio, death for death! / Haste still pays haste, and leisure answers 
leisure, / Like doth quit like, and Measure still for Measure.’11 But on the plea of 
Mariana, Angelo’s abandoned bride with whom he had unwittingly consummated 
his marriage — joined dramatically by the wronged Isabella — the Duke relents, 
and the play manages a happy ending, complete with all the obligatory marriages, 
qualifying it technically for inclusion among Shakespeare’s comedies.
Measure for Measure is set apart from other plays by Shakespeare, and from plays 
by his contemporaries, by the degree of attention it pays to law and legalism. Tudor-
Stuart drama is rich in images of justice, some of it quite specifically forensic. 
Tim Stretton has estimated that a third or more of Elizabethan and Jacobean plays 
8 1.3.53–4.
9 Many readers of Measure for Measure have wondered how the Duke knew of 
Mariana’s mistreatment and why in light of that knowledge he trusted Angelo to 
be the deputy in his apparent absence. Sir William Blackstone speculated that ‘the 
duke probably had learnt of the story of Mariana in some of his former retirements, 
“having ever loved the life removed”. And he had a suspicion that Angelo was but 
a seemer and therefore stays to watch him’ (Edmond Malone, Supplement to the 
Edition of Shakespeare’s Plays Published in 1778 by Samuel Johnson and George 
Steevens (1780) vol 1, 103).
10 5.1.366–70.
11 5.1.405–7.
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included a trial, an arraignment, or a lawsuit.12 This is not surprising. Shakespeare 
and his fellow dramatists had a unique relationship with law and lawyers. Many, 
if not most, of the Tudor-Stuart playwrights themselves had legal training — or 
less respectable brushes with the law.13 Ben Jonson had actually been convicted 
of murdering a fellow actor.14 But as Schlegel long ago observed: ‘In Measure for 
Measure Shakspeare [sic] was compelled by the nature of the subject to make his 
poetry more familiar with criminal justice than is usual with him.’15
Not only were plays like Measure for Measure performed before the King and his 
court, but the audience for contemporary drama almost always included lawyers 
and judges, ‘His Majesty’s Players’ in the real life dramas daily enacted in the 
King’s other courts, the courts of law. Many plays were actually performed in a 
specifically legal venue, neither the royal court nor the licensed playhouses like the 
Globe, but the Inns of Court. Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors was performed at 
Gray’s Inn in 1594 before what was described as ‘a riotous audience of learned 
lawyers’,16 and Twelfth Night, which has little to do with the holiday of its title, 
the last of the ‘twelve days of Christmas’, was performed as part of the season’s 
festivities at Middle Temple in 1602.17
Perhaps present at the first performance of Measure for Measure was Sir Edward 
Coke, then the King’s Attorney-General, although later his welcome at James’ court 
would be uncertain.18 That Coke was familiar with Shakespeare’s plays cannot be 
doubted. In one of his speeches to a grand jury he unmistakably echoed John of 
Gaunt’s familiar speech in praise of England from Richard II — ‘This royal throne 
of kings, this sceptre’d isle, / This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, / This other 
Eden, demi-paradise …’19 — in Coke’s paraphrase, ‘this sea-environed island … 
this so-well planted, pleasant, fruitful world, accounted Eden’s paradise’.20
12 Tim Stretton, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England (1998) 63.
13 Ibid 64.
14 Ben Jonson (C H Herford and Percy Simpson eds, 1925) vol 1, 18–9.
15 A W Schlegel, Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (John Black trans, 1889 
ed, 2nd revised ed by A J W Morrison) 338 (lectures originally delivered in Vienna, 
1809–11).
16 Paul A Jorgensen, ‘Introduction’ in Pelican Shakespeare: The Comedy of Errors 
(1964) 16.
17 Charles T Prouty, ‘Introduction’ in Pelican Shakespeare: Twelfth Night (1958) 15.
18 Sir Edward Coke served as Attorney-General until 1606 when he became Chief 
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. In 1613 he was transferred to the position 
of Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench but was dismissed in 1616 because 
of his disagreement with the King. Coke subsequently became a leader of the 
parliamentary opposition and was briefly imprisoned in the Tower in 1623. On his 
release, he resumed his activity and took the lead in framing the Petition of Right in 
1628. See generally Stephen D White, Sir Edward Coke and the Grievances of the 
Commonwealth, 1621–28 (1979).
19 Pelican Shakespeare: Richard II (1957) 1.4.40–66.
20 The Lord Coke His Speech and Charge (1607), quoted in Allan D Boyer, Sir Edward 
Coke and the Elizabethan Age (2003) 288.
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If Coke was in the audience for Measure for Measure, the representation of a man 
taking jurisdiction in his own cause might have arrested his attention.21 He was 
sensitive to the issue in the management of his own affairs, later deferring to a 
colleague to judge a dispute between himself and his tenants at Stoke.22 And he was 
almost certainly conversant with the legal question from his reading of Littleton’s 
Tenures. When Measure for Measure premiered, Coke was probably already hard 
at work on his massive commentary on that little treatise; Holdsworth thought he 
worked on it his entire life.23
Perhaps prompted by an actual case, Littleton had posed the question: suppose it 
was the custom of a certain manor that its lord could seize straying cattle and keep 
them until their owner paid him a fine in the amount he assessed. Could such a 
custom be accepted as part of the common law? To the sophisticated, or simply 
worldly-wise, the potential for abuse in the case appeared obvious. As Littleton put 
it (in Coke’s translation): ‘If he had dammages to the value of an halfpeny, he might 
assess and have therefore an C. [hundred] pound, which should be against reason.’24 
Reason is the test of custom, a custom claiming the force of law. Measured by 
reason, this custom fails, ‘because it is against reason, that if wrong be done any 
man, that he thereof should be his own judge’.25
To be your own judge, or even to have a serious conflict of interest, seems 
obviously unfair, a violation of common sense as well as common law. The ever-
sensible Dr Johnson thought it ‘the standing and perpetual rule of distributive 
justice ... to believe no man in his own cause’.26 For just this reason, the common 
law famously excluded the testimony of parties in their own lawsuits, a rule 
memorably mocked by Charles Dickens in the ludicrous breach of promise suit, 
21 I have earlier discussed the paradigm case of making a man a judge in his own cause 
in Due Process of Law: A Brief History (2003) ch 2. Some of the same sources used 
in that discussion are here put to a different use.
22 ‘Thear grew sum smale questions between him and sum of his tenants at Stoke 
about copies. He sent for me, prayed me to keep his court, and to order all things as 
I sholde see cawse in justice, upon view of his rolles and that he wolde be contented 
with what I determined withe him or against him’ (James Whitelocke, Liber 
Famelicus (John Bruce ed, 1858) 50). James Whitelocke served with Coke on the 
Court of King’s Bench.
23 William Holdsworth, History of English Law (3rd ed, 1945) vol 5, 466.
24 Edward Coke, Commentary upon Littleton (1628) section 212, 141a (‘s’il avoit 
dammages forsque al value d’un mail, il puissoit assesser et aver pur ceo C. lib’).
25 Ibid (‘pur ceo que il est encounter reason, que si tort soit fait a un home, que 
il de ceo serroit son judge demesne’). Reason remained a test of good custom for 
Blackstone: ‘To make a particular custom good, the following are necessary 
requisites … [among them, it must be] ‘reasonable; or rather, taken negatively … 
not … unreasonable’ (William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(first published 1765–9, 1979 ed) vol 1, 76–8). Indeed, it still is: State ex rel Thornton 
v Hay 462 P 2d 671, 677 (Or 1969) (citing Blackstone).
26 The Quotable Johnson (Stephen C Danckert ed, 1992) 74 (attributed).
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Bardell v Pickwick.27 In America, James Madison in the justly celebrated Federalist 
No. 10 explained that ‘no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because 
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his 
integrity’.28
The evil is no less obvious in a non-common law legal system, such as that in the 
Vienna of Measure for Measure — or in the Scotland from which King James 
had lately come. In the Corpus Juris Civilis, Julian is quoted as saying that ‘if one 
of the litigants has made the judge heir to all or part of his estate, another judge 
must of necessity be appointed, because it is unfair to make someone judge in his 
own affairs’.29 Canon law makes the possibility to profit from a decision one of the 
grounds to exclude a judge.30 Blaise Pascal included among his recorded thoughts 
that ‘the fairest man in the world is not allowed to be a judge in his own cause’.31
Four years after the first performance of Measure for Measure, James’ court was 
the scene of another drama involving a sovereign and his deputy, in this case 
King James himself and Sir Edward Coke, by then Chief Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas. According to his own account,32 Coke told James to his face that 
the sovereign could not personally judge a cause between himself and his subjects 
but had to act through his deputies, the judges. ‘The King in his own person 
cannot adjudge any case either criminal, as treason, felony, &c. or betwixt party 
and party, concerning his inheritance, chattels, goods, &c.’33 As Coke explained, ‘a 
party cannot have remedy against the King; so if the King give any judgment, what 
remedy can the party have?’ In a rare burst of tact, he omitted to point out that a 
remedy would be required only if the King gave a mistaken judgment. In this case, 
27 Charles Dickens, The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club (first published 
1836–37, 1948 ed) ch 34; see also William S Holdsworth, Charles Dickens as a Legal 
Historian (1928) ch 4.
28 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist (first published 
1787–88, Benjamin Wright ed, 1961) 131.
29 Corpus Juris Civilis (Alan Watson trans, 1985 ed) 5.1.17 (‘si alter ex litigatoribus 
iudicem solum heredem uel ex parte fecerit, alius iudex necessario sumendus est, 
quia iniquum est aliquem suae rei iudicem fieri’).
30 The modern codification is in Canon 1448. (Code of Canon Law: Latin-English 
Edition (1983) 522–3: ‘Iudex cognoscendam ne suscipiat causam, in qua ratione … 
lucri faciendi aut damni vitandi, aliquid ipsius intersit’). Other grounds for exclusion 
are consanguinity, affinity, fiduciary relationship, amity or enmity.
31 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (1670) frag 44 (‘Il n’est pas permis au plus equitable homme 
du monde d’être juge en sa cause’).
32 Prohibitions del Roy (1608) 12 Coke 65; 77 ER 1342. Coke may have engaged 
in a little playwriting himself. Holdsworth thinks it ‘likely that Coke, having 
attended several Council meetings at which the king expressed his views as to the 
subordination of the law to the king, gave a narrative in which he stated the royal 
views, added authorities in favour of his own views, and threw it into a literary 
form which bears little resemblance to the spoken words used on this particular 
occasion … or the events which really happened’ (Holdsworth, above n 23, vol 5, 
430).
33 Prohibitions del Roy (1608) 12 Coke 64–5; 77 ER 1342.
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it was the deputies who were impartial and the King who was trying to judge his 
own cause.
To James’ retort that ‘the law was founded on reason and that he and others had 
reason, as well as the Judges’, Coke made his famous reply about the distinctive 
nature of legal reasoning, particularly in the common law:
Causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his 
subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason 
and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study and 
experience, before that a man can attain cognizance of it. ... The law... is 
‘the golden metwand and measure to try the causes of the subjects …, [it] 
protect[s] His Majesty in safety and peace.34
Indelicately, Coke alluded to the fact that James, born and bred in Scotland and 
only lately heir to the English Crown, was ‘not learned in the laws of his realm of 
England’. When the King cried treason, Coke said he responded with high medieval 
authority: ‘Bracton saith … Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege’ 
(the King must not be under man, but under God and the law)35 — before, that is, he 
fell prostrate at the feet of the angry monarch.36
The ideal of a ‘government of laws and not of men’ crossed the Atlantic with 
English settlers, beginning with the band that settled at Jamestown, Virginia, even 
as James and Coke were facing off. After American Independence, John Adams, 
like Coke linking the idea to the concept of separation of powers, spelled it out at 
perhaps unnecessary length in the Massachusetts Constitution, where it still is:
In this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the 
executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never 
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial 
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to 
the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.37
34 Prohibitions del Roy (1608) 12 Coke 65; 77 ER 1343. Coke also described the laws 
of England as ‘the golden metwand, whereby all men’s causes are justly and evenly 
measured’ in his Fourth Institute (1817) ch 47, 239.
35 Prohibitions del Roy (1608) 12 Coke 65; 77 ER 1343. The passage to which Coke 
referred may be found in Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (S E Thorne 
trans, George E Woodbine ed, 1968) vol 2, 33). In 1928, Harvard Law School Dean 
Roscoe Pound chose a lapidary version of Coke’s admonition to inscribe over the 
portal of the enlarged Langdell Hall: NON SVB HOMINE SED SVB DEO ET 
LEGE (Arthur E Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 
1817–1967 (1967) illustration facing page 243).
36 Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir 
Edward Coke (1956) 305 (quoting Sir Rafe Boswell).
37 Mass. Const. of 1780, Decl. Rts. XXX, in The Popular Sources of Political 
Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, at 447–8 (Oscar & 
Mary Handlin eds 1966).
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John Marshall repeated the maxim ‘emphatically’ in Marbury v Madison, the 
landmark case for ‘judicial review’, the doctrine that American judges have the 
power to declare statutes unconstitutional and void.38
Two years after his historic face-off with King James, Coke returned to the problem 
of ‘a judge in his own cause’ in that cause célèbre, Bonham’s Case.39 Dr Thomas 
Bonham was charged by the Royal College of Physicians with practising physic 
in London without a licence. As permitted by its royal charter, which had been 
repeatedly confirmed by statute, the college tried Bonham in its own court. Finding 
him guilty, it imposed sentence of fine and imprisonment, and — as also permitted 
by its charter — prepared to pocket half the fine. When Bonham challenged his 
confinement in an action for false imprisonment, Coke delivered an elaborate 
opinion in his favour. Carefully reading the crabbed language of the ancient charter, 
Coke found that the college was not in fact empowered to imprison for unlicensed 
practice but only for malpractice, which had not been alleged.
Although technically the question of Bonham’s fine was not before him, Coke 
addressed it anyway, acidly commenting that the physicians ‘cannot be judge, 
ministers, and parties; judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make 
summons; and parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture’.40 In characteristic 
fashion, he capped his judgment with Latin reminiscent of the Corpus Juris: 
‘aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa...’ (someone ought not be a judge in 
his own cause).41
As in Bonham’s Case, so in Measure for Measure the proper order of things 
is turned upside down: a subordinate is deputed to try his own cause. Angelo is 
now cast in the heroic role invoked in the medieval Chancellor of Oxford’s Case 
(1430).42 Like the lord of the manor described by Littleton who claimed the right to 
assess his own damages, the Chancellor of Oxford claimed the right to adjudicate 
his own expenses in repairing pavements along the High Street left unrepaired by 
the adjoining householders. The claim was resisted by the plea that the Chancellor 
could not be a judge in his own cause. To answer that plea and to demonstrate 
the possibility of fairness even in such a case, the unnamed serjeant arguing for 
the Chancellor recited the fanciful tale of an early Pope who was accused by the 
cardinals of a serious offence. When the Pope demanded that they judge him, they 
refused because he was their superior, the temporal head of the church on earth. 
So the Pope tried his own cause and condemned himself to death.43 Angelo, the 
38 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 163.
39 (1610) 8 Coke 107a; 77 ER 638.
40 Ibid, 118a.
41 Ibid. Cf Corpus Juris Civilis, above n 29, 5.1.17. See text at n 29 above.
42 (1430) Y B Hilary 8 Hen 6, f 18b, pl 6, described in D E C Yale, ‘Iudex in Propria 
Causa: An Historical Excursus’ (1974) 33 Cambridge Law Journal 80, 92–5.
43 Yale thought the recitation of the legend was not meant to be taken seriously — 
‘I suspect that the serjeant’s “fable” was intended for light relief at the end of a 
morning’s argument rather than anything else’ — but conceded that it was ‘widely 
believed in the Middle Ages’ (above n 42, 94).
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fallen angel in Measure for Measure, reaches the same conclusion, but only after 
the intervention of the Duke, ‘like power divine’.
In the years that followed the first performance of Measure for Measure, the 
relation between James and Parliament steadily deteriorated until, under his son 
Charles I, civil war erupted, ending in the final defeat of the royal forces and the 
trial and condemnation of the King by deputies — not his own, of course, but 
Parliament’s. No one forty years earlier, not even Shakespeare, could have foreseen 
this dramatic outcome.44
The ironies of history are never-ending. As a result of Parliament’s famous victory 
over the Crown, consolidated by the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Parliament won 
control over the law as well. Blackstone, commenting on the laws of England on the 
eve of the American Revolution, was forced to admit that the common law had to 
yield to legislation: ‘Where the common law and a statute differ, the common law 
gives place to the statute …’45 To demonstrate once and for all that the old verities 
were gone, the Commentator took up the hoary problem of a judge-in-his-own-
cause. It was ‘evil’, a violation of natural right, to be avoided if at all possible.46 
A grant of general jurisdiction to a judge, ‘to try all causes that arise within his 
manor of Dale’, should be construed not to extend to that extremity, ‘because it is 
unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel’.47
But, Blackstone reluctantly conceded:
If we could conceive it possible for the parliament to enact, that he should 
try as well his own causes as those of other persons, there is no court that 
has power to defeat the intention of the legislature, when couched in such 
evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the 
legislature or no.48
In short, Parliament could do what the common law could not do: defy reason itself. 
‘If the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, 
I know of no power that can control it.’49 Separation of powers, which Coke had 
used as a bulwark against royal aggression, had become a barrier the courts could 
44 Shakespeare was remembered at the time. The lines from Macbeth — ‘Nothing in 
his life / Became him like the leaving it’ (1.4.3–4) — were reportedly applied to the 
martyred king (Pelican Shakespeare: Macbeth (1956)).
45 Blackstone, above n 25, vol 1, 89 (canon of statutory construction no 7).
46 Ibid, vol 4, 8.
47 Ibid, vol 1, 91 (canon of statutory construction no 10: ‘Acts of parliament that 
are impossible to be performed are of no validity, and if there arise out of them 
collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, 
they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void’).
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. For further discussion of Blackstone’s canons of statutory construction, see 
John V Orth, ‘Blackstone’s Rules for the Construction of Statutes’ in Wilfrid Prest 
(ed) Blackstone and His Commentaries: Biography, Law, History (2009) 79.
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not pass. Even without Duke Vincentio’s benign motive of dramatically exposing 
injustice, Parliament could order its Angelos to try their own causes, and no court 
in England could stop it.
But not in America! — at least not after Independence and the development 
of American constitutional law. When in 1928 the United States Supreme Court 
finally confronted the case of a-judge-in-his-own-cause, in the form of a statute that 
allowed a magistrate to keep part of any fines he imposed, it found the practice a 
violation of constitutionally protected due process.50 Sir Edward Coke would have 
approved.
Whether Coke approved of the denouement in Measure for Measure is another 
matter. The Duke’s pardon of all and sundry saved the play from a bloody ending, 
but exemplified the kind of discretionary justice that precipitated the ‘war of the 
writs’ between the courts of common law and equity. As Tim Stretton reminds us, 
Coke and his fellow judges were inclined to strict enforcement, even of penal bonds 
that almost (but not quite) reached the extremity of Shylock’s pound of flesh.51 In 
Coke’s words: ‘All causes should be measured by the golden and straight metwand 
of the law, and not by the incertain and crooked cord of Discretion.’52
As befits England’s greatest property lawyer, Coke’s chosen image of the law was 
a metwand, also spelled (and perhaps usually pronounced) metewand, a sort of 
yardstick used for the legal description of land by metes and bounds53 — the way it 
is still done in some American states.54 Thinking of the law as a measuring rod also 
came naturally to John Selden, Coke and Shakespeare’s scholarly contemporary, 
who expressed the common law’s fear of discretionary justice by his memorable 
comparison of equity to the length of the Chancellor’s foot:
For law we have a measure … [and] know what to trust to: equity is 
according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as it is larger or 
narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the 
measure we call a foot, to be the Chancellor’s foot.55
50 Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510 (1928) (citing Bonham’s Case).
51 Tim Stretton, ‘Contract, Debt Litigation and Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice’ 
(2010) 31 Adelaide Law Review 111. In common with other common lawyers, Coke 
believed that written instruments, and the terms they contained, needed to be taken 
seriously and enforced, even in cases involving apparent injustice.
52 Edward Coke, above n 34, ch 1, 41.
53 Compare this with the entry in the table in Edward Coke, above n 34, under 
‘Discretion’ (‘metewand’). According to tradition, King Henry I ‘made the length 
of his own arm the standard of the mete-wand’: Francis Palgrave, The History of 
Normandy and England (1851–64) vol 4, 709.
54 See, eg, Patrick K Hetrick and James B McLaughlin, Jr, Webster’s Real Estate Law 
in North Carolina (5th ed, 1999) vol 1, 419 (‘In North Carolina the most usual method 
of describing land, particularly nonurban and irregularly shaped tracts, is by metes 
and bounds’).
55 Table Talk of John Selden (Frederick Pollock ed, 1927) 43 (spelling and punctuation 
modernised).
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Images of weights and measures abound in Measure for Measure. Isabella admits, 
‘We cannot weigh our brother with ourself’.56 Angelo, who before he succumbs to 
temptation prides himself on his ‘gravity’, which he would not change ‘for an idle 
plume / Which the air beats for vain’,57 is soon taunting Isabella: ‘Say what you can, 
my false o’erweighs your true.’58 The Duke pretends to disbelieve Isabella when 
she accuses Angelo because ‘If he had so offended, / He would have weighed thy 
brother by himself, / And not have cut him off’.59 Finally, dropping his disguise, the 
Duke proceeds ‘by cold gradation and well-balanced form’60 to have ‘the corrupt 
deputy scaled’,61 weighed in the balance and found wanting — until, that is, he is 
persuaded to pardon all offenders.
It is tempting to read the conclusion of Measure for Measure as the triumph of 
mercy over justice, and the religiously inclined seem particularly to favour this 
reading.62 But Shakespeare is obviously aware of the paradoxical nature of ‘the 
quality of mercy’. Escalus, left by the Duke as second in command, early admits 
that ‘Mercy is not itself, that oft looks so; / Pardon is still the nurse of second 
woe’.63 As if to demonstrate the point, Mistress Overdone overdoes it in the next 
Act when she pleads for mercy, provoking the exasperated response: ‘Double and 
treble admonition, and still forfeit in / the same kind! This would make mercy 
swear and play / the tyrant.’64 As the unsympathetic Angelo correctly observes: 
‘Those many had not dared to do that evil, / If the first that did the edict infringe / 
Had answer’d for his deed’.65 He unerringly puts his finger on the flaw in Isabella’s 
facile argument that he should condemn the sin but pardon the sinner: ‘Condemn 
the fault and not the actor of it? / Why, every fault’s condemned ere it be done.’66 
Responding to her plea for pity, he makes the wise retort: ‘I show it most of all 
when I show justice, / For then I pity those I do not know.’67
There is no greater danger in reading Shakespeare than reductionism. German 
writers seem particularly susceptible. Richard Wagner in his early opera Das 
Liebesverbot (usually translated as The Ban on Love) turned Measure for Measure 
56 2.2.126. Theobald adopts William Warburton’s sensible suggestion that Shakespeare 
intended ‘We cannot weigh our brother with yourself’ (Theobald, above n 4, vol 1, 
338).
57 2.4.11–2.
58 2.4.170.
59 5.1.110–2.
60 4.3.97.
61 3.1.248.
62 See, eg, C M A McCauliff, ‘The Bawd and the Bard: Mercy Tempers Strict Statutory 
Application in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure’ (2004) 43 Catholic Lawyer 81; 
Michael J Willson, ‘A View of Justice in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and 
Measure for Measure’ (1995) 70 Notre Dame Law Review 695.
63 2.1.267–8.
64 3.2.181–3.
65 2.2.115.
66 2.2.37–8.
67 2.2.100.
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into a parody of German hypocrisy about sex,68 while Bertolt Brecht, trying to 
repeat his success in adapting The Beggar’s Opera, succeeded only in producing 
the forgettable Die Rundköpfe und die Spitzköpfe (Roundheads and Peakheads),69 a 
Marxist caricature of official corruption and class bias.70
Curiously, among all the legal issues raised in Measure for Measure the one thing 
not mentioned is the one that comes most readily to the restless modern mind: law 
reform. Repeal the law against love, or at least reduce the sentence. The Duke in 
disguise seems to hover on the edge of awareness: ‘Laws for all faults, / But faults 
so countenanced that the strong statutes / Stand like forfeits in a barber’s shop, / 
As much in mock as mark.’71 In fact, one modern legal scholar has read Measure 
for Measure as Shakespeare’s dramatic manifesto against ‘laws seeking to enforce 
private morality’,72 using it to condemn a 1986 United States Supreme Court 
decision upholding the constitutionality of a state statute criminalising sodomy73 — 
a decision, incidentally, the Court has since overturned.74
But this is just another reductionist reading of the play. Shakespeare is, of course, 
acutely aware of the difficulty of legal enforcement in such matters. Pompey, the 
clownish tapster, asks Escalus: ‘Does your worship mean to geld and splay all the / 
youth of the city?’75 And the fantastic Lucio informs the Duke in disguise that ‘it 
is impossible to extirp it quite, friar, / till eating and drinking be put / down’.76 
The Provost observes that ‘all sects, all ages smack of this vice’.77 Even the saintly 
68 Wagner’s own plot summary of Das Liebesverbot (1836) is in his autobiography, My 
Life (first published 1880, Andrew Gray trans, Mary Whittall ed, 1983) 113–8. For a 
critical analysis of the opera, see Charles Osborne, The Complete Operas of Wagner 
(1990) 40 (in which Wagner’s libretto is described as ‘a travesty of Shakespeare’s 
play’). Das Liebesverbot received one of its rare public performances at the 
Glimmerglass Opera in Cooperstown, New York from 19 July to 22 August 2008. 
Reviews appeared in the New York Times (12 August 2008), Wall Street Journal 
(13 August 2008), and Financial Times (15 August 2008). See also Opera News 
(November 2008) 44–5.
69 Bertolt Brecht, Roundheads and Peakheads: Rich and Rich Make Good Company (N 
Goold-Verschoyle trans, 1937), in Jungle of Cities and Other Plays (1966) 167–283.
70 For a more sympathetic assessment of Brecht’s adaptation and an argument that 
he correctly understood Shakespeare’s meaning, see Louise Halper, ‘Measure for 
Measure: Law, Prerogative, Subversion’ (2001) 13 Cardozo Studies in Law and 
Literature 221. Daniel J Kornstein has his doubts. See ‘A Comment on Professor 
Halper’s Reading of Measure for Measure’ (2001) 13 Cardozo Studies in Law and 
Literature 265.
71 5.1.317–20. A learned New Jersey Superior Court Judge quoted the lines to illustrate 
‘the laxity of law enforcement in the area of barber shops’: Tomasi v Wayne, 313 A 2d 
229, 233 (NJ Super 1973) (Schwartz J).
72 Daniel J Kornstein, Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare’s Legal Appeal (1994) 35–51.
73 Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986).
74 Lawrence v Texas, 529 US 558 (2003).
75 2.1.217–8.
76 3.2.96–7.
77 2.2.5.
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Isabella is aware ‘there’s many have committed it’,78 and Angelo soliloquises ‘We 
are all frail’79 — before, that is, rushing off to his assignation.
There is certainly a problem with what Judge Bork has described as laws that are 
‘kept on the books as precatory statements, affirmations of moral principle’,80 often 
involving sexual practices. But the legal enforcement of private morality is just an 
extreme instance of a more general problem. So long as law forbids any form of 
human behaviour, the guilty party will claim extenuating circumstances and appeal 
to the judge for mercy. Whether Claudio should have been punished for fornication 
or not — and much ink has been spilled on the question of what his ‘true contract’ 
with Juliet entitled him to81 —there seems little reason not to punish Angelo for his 
obstruction of justice.82 Yet he is pardoned.
More than any other of his plays, Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure deals openly 
with religious, specifically Christian, themes.83 The playwright all but puts the holy 
name in Isabella’s mouth when, pleading for her brother, she invokes the doctrine 
of the atonement: ‘Alas, alas; / Why, all the souls that were were forfeit once, / And 
He that might the vantage best have took, / Found out the remedy.’84 The Duke’s 
sentence on Angelo inevitably puts the Bible-conscious listener in mind of the 
Sermon on the Mount: ‘Judge not, that ye be not judged. / For with what judgement 
ye judge, ye shall be judged, and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured 
to you againe.’85
78 2.2.89.
79 2.4.121.
80 Robert H Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990) 
96. See also Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme 
Court at the Bar of Politics (1962) 147. Both were referring to the birth control case, 
Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
81 See, eg, S Nagarajan, ‘Measure for Measure and Elizabethan Betrothals’ (1963) 
14 Shakespeare Quarterly 115; Karl P Wentersdorf, ‘The Marriage Contracts in 
Measure for Measure’ (1979) 32 Shakespeare Survey 129; Margaret Scott, ‘‘Our 
City’s Institutions’: Some Further Reflections on The Marriage Contracts in Measure 
for Measure’ (1982) 49 English Literary History 790. See also McCauliff, above n 62.
82 Mariana’s plea for Angelo — ‘His act did not o’ertake his bad intent, / And must 
be buried but as an intent / That perished by the way. Thoughts are no subjects, / 
Intents but merely thoughts’ (5.1.447–9) — has been quoted to illustrate the 
proposition that ‘in the criminal law, both a culpable mens rea and a criminal actus 
reus are generally required for an offense to occur’ (US v Apfelbaum, 445 US 115, 
132 (1980) (Rehnquist CJ) citing Glanville Williams, Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1961), 
6). But although Angelo failed in his attempt to extort Isabella’s consent to sex, in 
his attempt to order the untimely execution of Claudio, and in his attempt to acquit 
himself of corruption — all due to the Duke’s behind-the-scenes intervention — he 
did more than simply think about the attempts; he acted on them.
83 See generally Darryl Gless, Measure for Measure, the Law, and the Convent (1979).
84 2.2.72–5.
85 Matthew 7:1–2 (Geneva Bible).
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What is the Christian magistrate to do — charged with judging others, yet fearful 
for his own salvation? The priggish Angelo has an answer. His first and second 
response to Isabella’s plea for her brother’s life is to deny personal responsibility: 
‘It is the law, not I, condemns your brother’.86 ‘I, now the voice of the recorded 
law, / Pronounce a sentence on your brother’s life.’87 Richard Posner dismisses 
the argument on rather flimsy Freudian grounds. Angelo’s legalism, he says, 
is ‘connected with his being a natural underling, as well as with his effort to 
transcend his body and become all spirit’; it is ‘associated with immature, weak, 
and father-fixated personalities’.88
And yet I am not sure I know a better answer to the dilemma of judging than to 
dissociate the person of the judge from the judicial office. ‘The law, not I ….’ It may 
certainly, as in Measure for Measure, lead to arrogance in the person and harshness 
in the result, which is the point of Isabella’s bitter outburst about ‘man, proud man, / 
Dressed in a little brief authority, / Most ignorant of what he’s most assured’.89 But 
it may also endow an individual with the courage to discharge his duty. Sir Edward 
Coke probably did not need an access of courage, but his rallying cry to the House 
of Commons may have emboldened others: ‘The common law hath admeasured 
the King’s prerogative. It is not I, Edward Coke, that speaks it but the records that 
speak it.’90 ‘I, now the voice of the recorded law …’
Sexual desire had threatened to overbalance the established order in Vienna, but in 
the end all the sexual miscreants — Claudio, Angelo, Lucio, perhaps even the Duke 
himself — are safely housed in matrimony, sentenced to marriage rather than to 
death, to paraphrase W H Auden.91 But the play’s ending is actually no conclusion. 
86 2.2.80.
87 2.4.61–2.
88 Richard A Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (1988) 109. See 
also US v Chischilly, 30 F 3d 1144, 1163–4 (9th Cir, 1994) (Noonan J, dissenting): 
‘Angelo’s words to Isabella in Measure for Measure are classic in denying 
responsibility for what has to be the act of the judge, however much that act is in 
conformity with law’.
89 2.2.117–9. The lines have served as a counsel of humility to lawyers and judges. 
Francis Biddle, US Attorney General from 1941 to 1945, entitled the second 
volume of his autobiography, In Brief Authority (1962). Justice Eugene F Black of 
the Michigan Supreme Court quoted the line five times in his judicial opinions: 
Michigan State UAW Community Action Program Council (CAP) v Austin, 198 NW 
2d 385, 404 (Mich 1972) (Black J, dissenting); Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 158 
NW 2d 473, 476 (Mich 1968) (Black J, concurring); In re Apportionment of Michigan 
Legislature, 140 NW 2d 436, 439 (Mich 1966) (Black, J); Taylor v Auditor General, 
103 NW 2d 769, 786 (Mich 1960) (Black J, dissenting); Fritts v Krugh, 92 NW 2d 
604, 619 (Mich 1958) (Black J, dissenting). Susie Sharp, later the Chief Justice of 
North Carolina, reported that a fellow judge passed along the quotation on her first 
judicial appointment (Anna R Hayes, Without Precedent: The Life of Susie Marshall 
Sharp (2008) 146.
90 Quoted in Bowen, above n 36, 291
91 W H Auden, Lectures on Shakespeare (Arthur Kirsch ed, 2002) 191 (‘In the play, in 
every case, marriage is substituted for the death penalty’).
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As Schlegel observed long ago, since the Duke ‘ultimately extends a free pardon to 
all the guilty, we do not see how his original purpose, in committing the execution 
of the laws to other hands, of restoring their strictness, has in any wise been 
accomplished’.92 At the end, we are back at the beginning.
There are many wise counsels for law and lawyers in Measure for Measure, 
perhaps too many, for they tend to cancel one another out. At the risk of being 
reductionist myself, I suggest that the judge-in-his-own-cause is the play’s central 
image, reminding us that we are all in that predicament; that when we judge others, 
we judge ourselves; that in some sense we in the legal profession should not be 
doing what we must do. As Isabella challenged Angelo: ‘Go to your bosom; / 
Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know / That’s like my brother’s fault: 
if it confess / A natural guiltiness such as is his, / Let it not sound a thought upon 
your tongue / Against my brother’s life.’93 Judge not. May God have mercy on us 
all!
92 Schlegel, above n 15, 388.
93 2.2.136–41.
